Labelled sequent calculi are provided for a wide class of normal modal systems using truth values as labels. The rules for formula constructors are common to all modal systems. For each modal system, specific rules for truth values are provided that reflect the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation. Both local and global reasoning are supported. Strong completeness is proved for a natural two-sorted algebraic semantics. As a corollary, strong completeness is also obtained over general Kripke semantics. A duality result is established between the category of sober algebras and the category of general Kripke structures. A simple enrichment of the proposed sequent calculi is proved to be complete over standard Kripke structures. The calculi are shown to be analytic in a useful sense.
Introduction
Labelled deduction has been attracting much attention, namely within modal logic where it is natural to set up deduction systems using worlds as labels. The idea of using worlds as labels is already found in [13] . More recently, the idea was further explored in an attempt to produce modular calculi appropriate for automation. Indeed, while for defining a Hilbert calculus for a specific modal system one has to add just some extra axioms to the core calculus for system K, when setting up a sequent calculus (or a tableaux calculus, or a natural deduction calculus) for a specific modal system one has to start from scratch (or almost). Usually, the rules needed for the modal system at hand are quite and subtly different from those of system K (see, for instance, [10, 17] ). Labelled deduction opened a way out of this difficulty. With labelled deduction it is possible to keep the rules of the core calculus, adding for each modal system some extra rules about the labels (worlds), as proposed in, for instance, [8, 11, 3, 6, 16] .
The idea of labelled deduction also appeared outside the context of modal logic, namely for finite many-valued logics where it is natural to use the truth values as labels [7, 2, 12] .
More recently, labelled deduction has been applied in the context of research on combining logics. Namely, as discussed in [14] , combining deduction systems requires a sufficiently general notion of labelled deduction system in order to make possible to combine, for instance, a natural deduction calculus for a modal system with a natural deduction calculus for a finitely many-valued logic. To this end, it is convenient to set up a deduction system with labels extracted from a suitable algebra of truth values.
In this paper, we adopt this novel approach, studying labelled sequent calculi for normal modal systems with labels extracted from an ordered algebra of truth values. The basic assertions are of the form θ ≤ ϕ expressing that truth value θ is less than or equal to the denotation of formula ϕ. Observe that by a truth value we intend here a modal truth value that, in the context of Kripke semantics, corresponds to a set of worlds.
The sequent calculi proposed in Section 2 share a common basis composed of: (i) structural rules; (ii) rules about the order among truth values; and (iii) rules for the formula constructors. The sequent calculus for each modal system is obtained by adding to this common basis specific rules imposing the underlying properties of the accessibility relation. The calculi support both global and local reasoning (corresponding to entailment over Kripke structures and entailment over worlds, respectively). Section 2 ends with some metatheorems not only interesting in themselves but also essential to the proof of the completeness results.
In Section 3, we start by proposing a new algebraic semantics involving two sorts (a sort for truth values and a sort for denotations of formulae). A quite general completeness result is proved assuming very little about the sequent calculus at hand (therefore, applicable outside the context of modal logic). Afterwards, we show how to move between general Kripke structures and such algebras in order to: (i) establish a characterization result showing that the proposed specific rules do characterize the frames with the intended properties of the accessibility relation; and (ii) obtain a completeness result over general Kripke structures as a corollary of the completeness theorem over algebraic semantics.
Observe that the proposed labelled language is rich enough to express properties of the accessibility relation that are not expressible by modal formulae (such as, irreflexivity, antisymmetry and asymmetry). Furthermore, we show that the proposed specific rules characterize the envisaged properties even among general Kripke structures. This ability to deal with general Kripke semantics is a key advantage of the "truth values as labels" approach proposed in this paper compared with the traditional "worlds as labels" approach. By the way, we also provide a simple enrichment of the language that leads to complete calculi over standard Kripke semantics.
Section 3 ends with a duality between the category of sober algebras and the category of general Kripke structures (with p-morphisms) and with a semantic proof of the analyticity of the proposed calculi (that is, we only need to apply A (schema) substitution over Σ is a map σ such that 1 : (i) σ(ξ i ) ∈ F (Σ); (ii) σ(τ i ) ∈ T (Σ); (iii) σ(Γ i ) ∈ B f (A(Σ) ∪ {Γ i : i ∈ N}). We denote the set of (schema) substitutions over Σ by Sbs(Σ).
A ground substitution over Σ is a schema substitution ρ such that: (i) ρ(ξ i ) ∈ gF(Σ); (ii) ρ(τ i ) ∈ gT(Σ); (iii) ρ(Γ i ) ∈ B f (gA(Σ)). We denote the set of ground substitutions over Σ by gSbs(Σ).
Calculi
A sequent over a signature Σ is a pair s = ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , written ∆ 1 → ∆ 2 , where ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ∈ B f (A(Σ) ∪ {Γ i : i ∈ N}). A sequent is said to be ground if it is written without meta-variables and it is said to be closed if furthermore it has no variables.
A (local) proviso over Σ is a map π : gSbs(Σ) → 2. The unit proviso up is as follows: up(ρ) = 1 for every ρ ∈ gSbs(Σ). The zero proviso zp is as follows: zp(ρ) = 0 for every ρ ∈ gSbs(Σ).
Given two provisos π, π ′ , their intersection is the proviso (π ∩ π ′ ) such that (π ∩ π ′ )(ρ) = π(ρ) × π ′ (ρ). And we say that π ⊆ π ′ when π(ρ) ≤ π ′ (ρ) for each ground substitution ρ.
Given a schema substitution σ and a proviso π, the proviso (πσ) is as follows: (πσ)(ρ) = π(σρ) for every ρ ∈ gSbs(Σ).
Observe that, for every proviso π and ground substitution ρ, the proviso (πρ) is either up or zp.
A rule over Σ is a triple r = {s 1 , . . . , s p }, s, π , written
where s 1 , . . . , s p , s are sequents over Σ and π is a proviso over Σ. When π is up, the rule may be written
Given a sequent s = ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 and a substitution σ both over Σ, we denote by sσ the instance ∆ 1 σ, ∆ 2 σ of s by σ. Given a rule r and a substitution σ both over Σ, we denote by rσ the instance s 1 σ . . . s p σ sσ ⊳ πσ of r by σ. A (sequent) calculus is a pair C = Σ, R where Σ is a signature and R is a finite set of rules over Σ.
Within the context of a sequent calculus C, we say that a sequent s ′ is derived from a set S of sequents with proviso π, written S ⊢ C s ′ ⊳ π, if there is a sequence d 1 , π 1 , . . . , d n , π n such that:
• d 1 is s ′ and π ⊆ π 1 ;
1 Given a set U , we denote by B f U the set of all finite bags (multisets) of elements in U .
• for every i = 1, . . . , n:
-either d i ∈ S and π i is up (justification: hypothesis); -or there is an assertion that occurs in both sides of d i and π i is up (justification: axiom);
-or there are r ∈ R, σ ∈ Sbs(Σ), p ∈ N and i 1 , . . . , i p ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n} such that
When the proviso π is up, we may write S ⊢ C s ′ . And we may write ⊢ C s when the set of premises is empty. Furthermore, when the signature is obvious from the context we may write ⊢ R instead of ⊢ C .
The derivation sequence d 1 , π 1 , . . . , d n , π n is said to be sober if, for each i = 2, . . . , n, i appears in the justification of some d j such that j < i. It is straightforward to set up an algorithm to make sober any given derivation sequence. It is also simple to set up an algorithm for extracting the traditional derivation tree from any given sober derivation sequence.
When making proofs, we may write d 1 , . . . , d n for the derivation sequence d 1 , up , . . . , d n , up .
Derivation establishes a finitary consequence operator for ground sequents thanks to the following result: Proposition 2.1 For any sequent calculus C:
Extensive S ⊢ C s ⊳ up for each sequent s ∈ S.
Idempotent If S 1 ⊢ C s ⊳ π s for each s in a finite set S of sequents and
The following result is also straightforward to prove (by induction on the length of the derivation). Proposition 2.2 For any sequent calculus C = Σ, R and substitution σ over Σ, if S ⊢ C s ′ ⊳ π with derivation sequence d 1 , π 1 , . . . , d n , π n then Sσ ⊢ C s ′ σ ⊳ πσ with derivation sequence d 1 σ, π 1 σ , . . . , d n σ, π n σ .
Structural rules
A sequent calculus C = Σ, R is said to be structural if R contains the following weakening, contraction, conjugation and cut rules:
The rules above are known as structural rules. These structural rules are the usual ones in sequent calculi plus those needed to deal with conjugates. Other rules that may be present in the sequent calculus at hand are known as proper rules.
Order rules
Before proceeding, we need to introduce the following provisos:
A structural sequent calculus C = Σ, R is said to be an order sequent calculus if it contains the following additional order rules:
These rules impose intended meanings to the basic assertions that should be obvious. But, it is worthwhile to note that if Ωt holds then t is intended to denote an atomic truth value (where a formula either holds or does not hold).
Observe also that this set of rules, although convenient, is by no means minimal. For instance, rules L# and R# allow the derivation of the F rules from the corresponding T rules. Moreover, rule Ω⊤ is derived from RgenT. Note also that not all of these rules are needed for obtaining later on the completeness result over Kripke semantics (Theorem 3.25). Indeed, rules ref and asym are only needed for establishing the duality between the algebraic semantics and the Kripke semantics (see Subsection 3.4) .
Note that the provisos used above do not change value when the environment of the rule at hand is enriched with closed assertions. More precisely, a rule is said to be endowed with a persistent proviso if its proviso does not change value when the environment of the rule is enriched with a closed assertion.
Obviously, that is the case of any rule with the unit proviso up (which is omitted). That is also the case of any rule with a "fresh variable" proviso like
as long as δ is closed. Therefore, according to this definition, the order rules above are endowed with persistent provisos.
Modal system K specific rules
We now proceed to define the sequent calculus C K = Σ k , R K for modal system K. The modal signature Σ K = C, O, X, Y, Z is as follows:
• C 2 = {∧, ∨, ⇒};
• O 0 = {⊥, ⊤};
• O 1 = {I, N};
• O 2 = {lb};
• Y = {y i : i ∈ N};
• Z = {z i : i ∈ N}.
Besides the structural and order rules introduced above, R K contains the following specific rules:
Rules I and ΩI impose that I(t) is an atomic truth value contained in t, as long as the latter is not bottom. Rules NΩ state that the neighborhood of a truth value t is induced by the neighbors of the atomic truth values contained in t. Rules lb establish that lb(t 1 , t 2 ) is some lower bound of t 1 and t 2 .
The rules about the formula constructors fall into two main classes. The rules about f , t, ∧ and hold for any truth value, while the rules about ¬, ⇒, ∨ and ♦ hold only for atomic truth values, as expressed by Ωτ 1 .
In the rest of the paper, we shall refer to a modal sequent calculus as any enrichment of the system K sequent calculus with additional rules endowed with persistent provisos. Several modal sequent calculi in this sense are considered in Subsection 2.6.
The two examples below of derivations in C K illustrate how the calculus can be used for modal reasoning.
Example: Derivation of the necessitation rule
Example: Derivation of the normality axiom
LgenF : 12, 13, 14
12
14
Rules for other modal systems
Other modal systems defined by properties of the accessibility relation can be easily obtained by adding suitable rules. For instance:
Additional rule for T (reflexive)
Additional rule for B (symmetric)
Additional rule for K4 (transitive)
Additional rule for D (serial)
Additional rule for K5 (Euclidean)
Additional rule for C (confluent)
Additional rule for W (transitive and well bounded)
Additional rule for X (irreflexive)
Additional rule for Y (antisymmetric)
Additional rule for Z (asymmetric)
In Subsection 3.3, these rules are shown to characterize precisely the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation (even among general Kripke structures). Given the greater expressiveness of the proposed labelled language, it is not surprising that we can capture more properties of the accessibility relation than those that are axiomatizable in standard modal language (namely, irreflexivity, antisymmetry and asymmmetry). Note en passant that these three properties are also not directly expressible in the language of modal logic labelled with worlds (unless one extends the labelling language to a full quantifier calculus; see [16] ). However, they are axiomatizable in hybrid logic (see [1] ).
It is important to note that, even in the case of an axiomatizable property, it is worthwhile to replace the axiom by a rule about the truth values. Indeed, by doing so, we hope to preserve the good properties of the formula sub-calculus (namely, cut elimination) and concentrate the unavoidable consequences of the new rule on the sub-calculus for truth values. We return to this issue in the concluding remarks.
Observe also that, in the case of an axiomatizable property, we might be tempted to try to show that the proposed rule above is correct by verifying that the axiom and the rule are inter-derivable in C K . For instance, consider reflexivity. It is straightforward to build a derivation in C K of the corresponding modal axiom from rule T above. Indeed:
On the other hand, it is not possible in C K to derive rule T above from the modal axiom for reflexivity. As we shall see in Subsection 3.3, the sequent calculus C K is sound with respect to general Kripke structures (Theorem 3.17). So, it is no surprise that rule T is not derivable from → ⊤ ≤ ξ 1 ⇒ ξ 1 . Indeed, rule T (as will be shown by Theorem 3.18 in Subsection 3.3) does characterize the general frames with reflexive accessibility relation, while the axiom does so only among the standard frames. Clearly, the axiom is satisfiable by a general Kripke structure with a non reflexive accessibility relation. For instance, consider the general Kripke frame W, , B where:
It is trivial to verify that every structure over this general frame does satisfy the axiom for reflexivity. It is worthwhile to point out that the modal axiom for reflexivity and the following mixed rule (about formulae and truth values)
are inter-derivable. However, we prefer rule T to rule T ′ in order to preserve, as much as possible, the separation between the formula sub-calculus and the truth value sub-calculus.
A similar analysis could be done about each of the other properties of the accessibility relation that are axiomatizable but there is no need to enter in details.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to produce a derivation of the modal axiom for confluence from rule C since it illustrates the use of both I and lb rules.
transT : 13, 14
13
→ ΩI(lb(N(y 2 ), N(y 3 ))) ΩI : 17
Again, the converse does not hold because (as will be shown by Theorem 3.18) rule C does caracterize the general frames with confluent accessibility relation while the corresponding modal axiom is more relaxed among general frames.
It is also worthwhile to show that the Löb axiom can be derived in C k from rule W since the derivation requires the use of the # rules.
RxiT : 10 10
LgenT : 14, 15, 16
17
RxiF : 20 20
Obviously, the converse does not hold since (as will be shown by Theorem 3.18) rule W does caracterize the general frames with transitive and well bounded accessibility relation while Löb's axiom is more relaxed among general frames.
Towards a hybrid version of C K
The discussion above (about, for instance, the non inter-derivability of rule T and the modal axiom for reflexivity) motivates the following question: is it possible to enrich C K in order to recover that inter-derivability? Semantically, as we saw, this will mean moving from general Kripke semantics towards standard Kripke semantics (as we shall further comment at the end of Subsection 3.3).
The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple and possibly useful for other purposes. It is enough: (i) first, to enrich the language with a coercion operator @ transforming any term t into a simple formula @t; (ii) and, second, add the following order rules:
In this way we established an enrichment of C K that we denote by C @ K . In this enriched calculus, it is possible to derive, for instance, rule T from the modal axiom for reflexivity:
The same holds for the other properties of the accessibility relation but we refrain from going into details.
The sequent calculus C @ K represents a first step towards a hybrid version of C K combining the ideas in this paper and those of hybrid logics [5, 4, 1] .
Local and global reasoning
In the context of a modal sequent calculus, local and global notions of prooftheoretic consequence can be defined as follows:
Lemma 2.3 Within the context of a modal sequent calculus:
Proof: Without loss of generality consider k = 2. 1. Consider the following derivation:
Consider the following derivation:
QED
With this lemma it is straightforward to establish the following result relating global and local reasoning.
Proposition 2.4
Within any modal sequent calculus:
using Lemma 2.3 and taking into account idempotence in Proposition 2.1)
⊢ R → ⊤ ≤ ((ψ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψ k ) ⇒ ϕ) iff ⊢ g R (ψ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψ k ) ⇒ ϕ. QED
Metatheorems
It is useful to denote by ∆ the bag {δ : δ ∈ ∆}. Then, it is straightforward to prove the following result taking into account that the conjugate of a conjugate of an assertion is the original assertion:
Theorem 2.5 (Metatheorem of conjugation) Let C be a structural sequent calculus. Then, for every set S of ground sequents and every ground sequent
The two following metatheorems will also be useful later on when establishing the completeness theorem. Theorem 2.6 (Metatheorem of contradiction) Let C be a structural sequent calculus. Then, for every set S of ground sequents and every ground sequent → ∆, if
then S ⊢ C → υ for every ground assertion υ.
Proof: Let ∆ be δ 1 , δ 2 without loss of generality. Then:
QED Theorem 2.7 (Metatheorem of deduction) Let C be a structural sequent calculus with rules endowed with persistent provisos. Then, for every set S of ground sequents and closed sequent δ ′ 1 , . . . , δ ′ m → ∆ ′′ :
Proof:
′ n does constitute a derivation because the unchanged justifications still hold thanks to the fact that δ ′ 1 , . . . , δ ′ m are closed assertions and therefore any (persistent) proviso that otherwise might be violated is still fulfilled. QED Therefore, the metatheorem of deduction holds in any modal sequent calculus as defined at the end of Subsection 2.5 (precluding the use of non persistent provisos).
Semantics

Algebraic semantics
Let Σ = C, O, X, Y, Z be a signature. A Σ-algebra is a triple A = F, T, · A where:
• F and T are sets;
• · A is a map such that:
Let A be a Σ-algebra. An unbound variable assignment over A is a map α that maps each element of X to an element of T and each element of Z to an element of F . A bound variable assignment over A is a map β from Y to T .
The denotation at Σ-algebra A for unbound variable assignment α of ground simple formulae is inductively defined with the following rules:
The denotation at A for assignments α, β over A of ground terms is inductively defined with the following rules:
The satisfaction by A for α, β of ground assertions and sequents is defined as follows:
Furthermore, the satisfaction by A for α of ground assertions and sequents is defined as follows:
• Aα δ iff Aαβ δ for every bound variable assignment β over A;
Observe that, when dealing with closed simple formulae, terms, assertions and sequents, we may drop the reference to the assignments in denotations and satisfactions since they do not depend on them. For instance, if δ is a closed assertion then we may write A δ since, for any assignments α, α ′ , β, β ′ , Aαβ δ iff Aα ′ β ′ δ. A similar principle applies when we deal with terms, assertions and sequents without bound variables in which case we may drop the reference to the bound variable assignment. In the same vein, we may drop the reference to the unbound variable assignment when dealing with terms, assertions and sequents without unbound variables.
Given a class A of Σ-algebras, a ground sequent s is A-entailed by the ground sequents s 1 , . . . , s p , written s 1 , . . . , s p A s, iff, for each A ∈ A and unbound variable assignment α over A, Aα s whenever Aα s i for every i = 1, . . . , p.
The notion of entailment is easily extended to (schema) sequents possibly with provisos. A sequent s is A-entailed by the sequents s 1 , . . . , s p with proviso π, written s 1 , . . . , s p A s ⊳ π, iff s 1 ρ, . . . , s p ρ A sρ for every ground substitution ρ over Σ such that π(ρ) = 1.
The following results are the semantic counterparts of Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 3.1 Given a class A of Σ-algebras:
Idempotent If S 1 A s ⊳ π s for each s in a finite set S of sequents and
Proof: Straightforward. We prove only the last property. Assume S 1 A s ⊳ π s for each sequent s ∈ S and S A s ′ ⊳ π. So, by the projective property,
Thus, by definition of entailment, for every ρ such that (π ∩ ( s∈S π s ))(ρ) = 1, S 1 ρ A sρ for each sequent s ∈ S and Sρ A s ′ ρ. Therefore, for every such ρ, every A ∈ A and unbound variable assignment α over A: (i) if Aα s 1 ρ for every s 1 ∈ S 1 then Aα sρ for every s ∈ S; and (ii) if Aα sρ for every s ∈ S then Aα s ′ ρ. So, for every such ρ, every A ∈ A and α, if Aα s 1 ρ for every
Proof: We have to show Sσ A s ′ σ ⊳ πσ. That is, for an arbitrary ground substitution ρ such that (πσ)(ρ) = 1, we have to show (Sσ)ρ A (s ′ σ)ρ. By hypothesis, we know S A s ′ ⊳ π. That is, for every ground substitution ρ ′ such that π(ρ ′ ) = 1, we know Sρ ′ A s ′ ρ ′ . Since the substitution σρ is ground and, furthermore, π(σρ) = (πσ)(ρ) = 1, we know from the hypothesis S(σρ) A s ′ (σρ) which establishes the thesis taking into account the following property of substitutions δ(σρ) = (δσ)ρ. QED A class A of Σ-algebras is said to be appropriate for a Σ-rule {s 1 , . . . , s p }, s, π if s 1 , . . . , s p A s ⊳ π. And an algebra A is said to be appropriate for a rule if so is the class {A}.
Theorem 3.3 (Structural soundness)
The class of all Σ-algebras is appropriate for every structural rule over Σ.
Proof: It is straighforward to verify the thesis for each of the structural rules. For instance, consider the rule RwT. We have to verify that, for each Σ-algebra A, assignment α and ground substitution ρ, if Aα
QED A class A of Σ-algebras is said to be appropriate for a sequent calculus Σ, R if it is appropriate for each proper rule in R (and also for the structural rules thanks to the theorem above). And an algebra A is said to be appropriate for a sequent calculus if so is the class {A}.
A (sequent) logic is a triple L = Σ, R, A where Σ, R is a sequent calculus and A is a class of Σ-algebras. A sequent logic is said to be:
• sound if A is appropriate for Σ, R ;
• full if A is the class of all Σ-algebras that are appropriate for Σ, R ;
• complete if s 1 , . . . , s p ⊢ R s whenever s 1 , . . . , s p A s for any closed sequents s, s 1 , . . . , s p .
Thus, every full logic is sound. Furthermore:
Proof: 
. . , i q ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Thanks to the projective property in Proposition 3.1, it is enough to show s 1 , . . . ,
Since A is appropriate for every rule in R and using Proposition 3.2, we know
On the other hand, by induction hypothesis, we know
. . , q. Therefore, by Proposition 3.1 (idempotent) we obtain the envisaged result. QED
A sequent logic L = Σ, R, A is said to be structural/order/modal if its calculus Σ, R is structural/order/modal, respectively.
Within a modal logic, besides the local and global notions of proof-theoretic consequence presented before, we can also introduce their model-theoretic counterparts:
The following result is the semantic counterpart of Proposition 2.4.
Proof: Taking into account Theorem 3.4, from Lemma 2.3 we obtain:
Algebraic completeness
A set S of closed sequents is said to be consistent if for no closed assertion δ both → δ ∈ S and → δ ∈ S hold. And it is said to be maximal consistent if for every closed assertion δ either → δ ∈ S or → δ ∈ S but not both. Given a sequent calculus C = Σ, R and a maximal consistent set S of closed sequents over Σ, the syntactic algebra induced by C and S is the following Σ-algebra:
where:
• cgF(Σ), · A(C,S) | C is the free algebra generated by the symbols in C;
• cgT(Σ), · A(C,S) | O is the free algebra generated by the symbols in O;
Let ϕ ∈ gF(Σ). Given an unbounded variable assignment α over a syntactic algebra A(C, S), we denote by ϕα the closed simple formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each variable z ∈ Z by α(z).
Let θ ∈ gT(Σ). Given an unbounded variable assignment α and a bounded variable assignment β both over a syntactic algebra A(C, S), we denote by θαβ the closed term obtained from θ by replacing each variable x ∈ X by α(x) and each variable y ∈ Y by β(y).
This notation is extended to ground assertions and bags of ground assertions by identifying ϕαβ with ϕα. Lemma 3.6 Let C be a structural calculus, S a maximal consistent set of closed sequents, α an unbound variable assignment over A(C, S), β a bound variable assignment over A(C, S), ϕ a ground simple formula, and θ a ground term. Then:
Proof: Straightforward induction on the complexity of simple formula ϕ and term θ, respectively. QED Lemma 3.7 Let C be a structural calculus, S a maximal consistent set of closed sequents, α an unbound variable assignment over A(C, S), β a bound variable assignment over A(C, S), and δ a ground assertion. Then:
(ii) Both A(C, S)αβ θ ⊑ θ ′ iff S ⊢ C → (θ ⊑ θ ′ )αβ and A(C, S)αβ θ ≤ ϕ iff S ⊢ C → (θ ≤ ϕ)αβ are obtained in a similar way.
αβ are obtained in a similar way. QED Lemma 3.8 (Lifting) Let C be a structural calculus, S a maximal consistent set of closed sequents, α an unbound variable assignment over A(C, S), β a bound variable assignment over A(C, S), and ∆ ′ → ∆ ′′ a ground sequent. Then:
This fact is trivially obtained by applications of right weakening.
Then, using Theorem 2.6, we would be able to show that every closed assertion is derivable from S, therefore contradicting that S is consistent. QED
Observe that, in the conditions of the previous lemma, if, furthermore, the sequent ∆ ′ → ∆ ′′ is closed then we have:
Lemma 3.9 (Appropriateness) The class of all syntactic algebras induced by a sequent calculus is appropriate for it.
Proof: Let r = s 1 ...sp s be a ground instance of a (proper) rule of a sequent calculus C. Let α be an arbitrary unbound variable assignment over a syntactic algebra A(C, S). Assume that A(C, S)α s i for each i = 1, . . . , p. That is, for every bound variable assignment β, A(C, S)αβ s i for each i = 1, . . . , p. So, by Lemma 3.8, for every such β, S ⊢ C s i αβ, say with derivation sequence D s i αβ , for each such i. Then, it is straightforward to build, for every pair α, β, a derivation sequence for S ⊢ C sαβ using rule r and those derivation sequences. Thus, again by Lemma 3.8, for every such β, A(C, S)αβ s. That is, A(C, S)α s. QED Lemma 3.10 (Consistent extension) Let C be a structural sequent calculus with rules endowed with persistent provisos. If S is a consistent set of closed sequents and S ⊢ C → υ 1 , . . . , υ m for closed assertions υ 1 , . . . , υ m then the set S ∪ {→υ 1 , . . . , →υ m } is still consistent.
Proof: Assume that S ∪ {→υ 1 , . . . , →υ m } is inconsistent. Then, there is a closed assertion δ such that S, →υ 1 , . . . , →υ m ⊢ C → δ and S, →υ 1 , . . . , →υ m ⊢ C → δ. So, using the metatheorem of contradiction (Theorem 2.6),
Therefore, using the metatheorem of deduction (Theorem 2.7),
Thus, applying the metatheorem of conjugation (Theorem 2.5), we get Proof: Consider the logic L = Σ, R, A and let C = Σ, R . Assume that S ⊢ R ∆ ′ → ∆ ′′ with S ∪ {∆ ′ → ∆ ′′ } composed of closed sequents. Given an enumeration υ n with n ∈ N of the set of closed assertions, we start by extending S to a maximal consistent set S • as follows:
• S n+1 = S ∪ {→υ n } provided that S n ⊢ R → υ n S ∪ {→υ n } otherwise ;
Observe that S • is still consistent thanks to Lemma 3.10. Furthermore, by construction, it is maximal consistent. Therefore, S • ⊢ R ∆ ′ → ∆ ′′ because otherwise S • ⊢ R → δ for some δ ∈ ∆ ′′ ∪ ∆ ′ (using the same reasoning as in justification (2) in the proof of Lemma 3.8) and, hence, S • would be inconsistent. Thus, by Lemma 3.8 applied to a closed sequent,
On the other hand, for every s ∈ S we know that S ⊢ R s and, thus, again thanks to Lemma 3.8, A(C, S • ) s.
Since the logic is full and taking into account Lemma 3.9, A(C, S • ) is in A. 
since L is full and therefore sound; ⇐: thanks to the completeness theorem above, since we are dealing with closed sequents and modal logics are assumed to use only persistent provisos)
Kripke completeness
We now turn our attention to the traditional semantics of modal logic (based on, possibly general, Kripke structures). Namely, it is worthwhile to analyze the class of Kripke structures characterized by a given set of rules. More precisely, we would like to prove that, for instance, rule T does characterize the reflexive frames. It would also be nice to establish soundness and completeness results over general Kripke semantics by capitalizing on the algebraic completeness theorem proved in the previous subsection. Given a suitable choice function needed for interpreting I, it is straightforward to extract from any (possibly general) Kripke structure a Σ K -algebra while respecting the denotation of ground simple formulae. Recall that Σ K = C, O, X, Y, Z is the modal signature introduced in Subsection 2.5.
Let K = W, , B, V be a general Kripke structure over C where W is the non-empty set of worlds, is the accessibility relation between worlds, B ⊆ ℘W is the set of admissible truth values, and the valuation V maps each propositional symbol p i to an admissible truth value. Let ι be a choice function for W . Then, the Σ K -algebra Alg(K) = F, T, · Alg(K) induced by K is as follows:
• T = ℘W ;
• a ∈ Ω Alg(K) iff a is a singleton;
• N Alg(K) = λa. {w ′ ∈ W : exists w ∈ a such that w w ′ };
• lb Alg(K) = λaa ′ . a ∩ a ′ ;
• f Alg(K) = ∅;
• t Alg(K) = W ;
It is straightforward to verify the following facts that will allow us later on to concentrate on the semantics of f , p i , ¬, , ∨.
The following results show that the semantics of closed simple formulae is preserved when we move from a general Kripke structure to the corresponding Σ K -algebra. Lemma 3.13 Let K be a general Kripke structure. Then, for every closed simple formula ϕ,
Proof:
The proof is carried out by induction on the complexity of ϕ:
(Base) We have to consider only two representative cases:
(ii) ϕ is p i . Then:
(Step) We have to consider only three representative cases:
(ii) ϕ is ϕ ′ . Then:
QED Proposition 3.14 Given a general Kripke structure K and a closed simple formula ϕ, K ϕ iff Alg(K) ⊤ ≤ ϕ.
QED Proposition 3.15 Given a general Kripke structure K, an unbound variable assignment β over Alg(K) such that β(y 1 ) = {w} and a ground simple formula ϕ, Kw ϕ iff Alg(K)β y 1 ≤ ϕ.
Given a class K of general Kripke structures, let Alg(K) be the class {Alg(K) : K ∈ K}, and g K , ℓ K be the global, local entailment over K, respectively.
Theorem 3.16
Given a class K of general Kripke structures:
Without loss of generality consider k = 2:
ϕ whenever K ψ 1 and K ψ 2 iff (thanks to Proposition 3.14), for every A ∈ Alg(K), A ⊤ ≤ ϕ whenever A ⊤ ≤ ψ 1 and A ⊤ ≤ ψ 2 iff ψ 1 , ψ 2 g Alg(K) ϕ. 2. ψ 1 , ψ 2 ℓ K ϕ iff, for every K ∈ K and w ∈ W , Kw ϕ whenever Kw ψ 1 and Kw ψ 2 iff (thanks to Proposition 3.15), for every A ∈ Alg(K) and every assignment β such that β(y 1 ) = {w}, Aβ y 1 ≤ ϕ whenever Aβ y 1 ≤ ψ 1 and Aβ y 1 ≤ ψ 2 iff for every A ∈ Alg(K) and every assignment β, Aβ y 1 ≤ ϕ whenever Aβ y 1 ≤ ψ 1 , Aβ y 1 ≤ ψ 2 and Aβ Ωy 1 iff ψ 1 , ψ 2 g Alg(K) ϕ. QED Theorem 3.17 For every general Kripke structure K, the Σ K -algebra Alg(K) is appropriate for each rule in R K .
Proof:
(i) The algebra Alg(K) is appropriate for each structural rule thanks to Theorem 3.3.
(ii) The algebra Alg(K) is appropriate for each order rule in Subsection 2.4 because inclusion does fulfill the properties imposed by those rules.
For instance, consider rule RgenF. Let ρ be a ground substitution such that (τ 2 : y)(ρ) = 1 and (τ 2 / ∈ τ 1 , Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(ρ) = 1. So τ 2 ρ is a variable, say y i , that is fresh.
Let α be an arbitrary unbound variable assignment over Alg(K). Assume that the pair Alg(K)α satisfies the premise Ωy i , y i ⊑ τ 1 ρ, Γ 1 ρ → Γ 2 ρ, y i ≤ ξ 1 ρ. We have to prove that the pair Alg(K)α satisfies the conclusion Γ 1 ρ → Γ 2 ρ, τ 1 ρ ≤ ξ 1 ρ where y i does not occur. Since Alg(K)α satisfies the premise, we know that, for every bound variable assignment β, there is δ β in Γ 2 ρ ∪ {y i ≤ ξ 1 ρ} ∪ {℧y i , y i ⊑ τ 1 ρ} ∪ Γ 1 ρ such that the triple Alg(K)αβ satisfies δ β .
For each β we have to consider the following two cases: (a) there is δ β in Γ 2 ρ ∪ Γ 1 ρ such that Alg(K)αβ δ β which immediately establishes that Alg(K)αβ satisfies Γ 1 ρ → Γ 2 ρ and, hence, the conclusion of the rule. (b) Otherwise, we know that there is δ β in {y i ≤ ξ 1 ρ}∪{℧y i , y i ⊑ τ 1 ρ} such that Alg(K)αβ δ β . Furthermore, we also know that, for every assignment η y iequivalent to β, there is δ η in Γ 2 ρ ∪ {y i ≤ ξ 1 ρ} ∪ {℧y i , y i ⊑ τ 1 ρ} ∪ Γ 1 ρ such that Alg(K)αη δ η . Moreover, since y i does not occur in Γ 2 ρ ∪ Γ 1 ρ, Alg(K)αη → Γ 2 ρ, Γ 1 ρ. So, for every such η, there is δ η in {y i ≤ ξ 1 ρ} ∪ {℧y i , y i ⊑ τ 1 ρ} such that Alg(K)αη δ η . In particular, for every η y i -equivalent to β and such that η(y i ) is a singleton and is included in [[
and, hence, the conclusion of the rule.
(iii) It remains to check that Alg(K) is appropriate for each specific rule of the modal calculus K given in Subsection 2.5. For instance, consider rule R♦. Let ρ be any ground substitution. Assume that Alg(K)α satisfies the premises of the rule Ωτ 1 ρ,
We have to prove that Alg(K)α satisfies the conclusion Ωτ 1 ρ,
Since Alg(K)α satisfies the premises, we know that, for every bound variable assignment β, there are:
• and δ 3 in Γ 2 ρ ∪ {Ωτ 2 ρ} ∪ {℧τ 1 ρ} ∪ Γ 1 ρ such that Alg(K)αβ δ 3 .
For each β, we have to consider two cases: (a) Alg(K)αβ δ i with δ i in Γ 2 ρ ∪ {℧τ 1 ρ} ∪ Γ 1 ρ for some i = 1, . . . , 3 which immediately establishes the conclusion of the rule. (b) Otherwise, we know that:
• Alg(K)αβ Ωτ 1 ρ;
• Alg(K)αβ δ 1 for some δ 1 in {τ 2 ρ ⊑ N(τ 1 ρ), ℧τ 2 ρ};
• Alg(K)αβ δ 2 for some δ 2 in {τ 2 ρ ≤ ξ 1 ρ, ℧τ 2 ρ};
• Alg(K)αβ δ 3 for some δ 3 in {Ωτ 2 ρ}, that is, Alg(K)β Ωτ 2 ρ.
That is:
• Alg(K)αβ Ωτ 1 ρ; 1 ρ) and, so, the conclusion of the rule. QED In order to state and prove the envisaged characterization results, we need some notation:
• P denotes a property of the accessibility relation among those considered in Subsection 2.6;
• r P denotes the corresponding sequent rule as indicated in Subsection 2.6;
• K P denotes the class of all general Kripke structures fulfilling P ;
• C P denotes the sequent modal calculus with the extra rule r P ;
• app(C P ) denotes the class of algebras appropriate for C P .
We also extend this notation to any finite set P of such properties in the obvious way.
Theorem 3.18 (Characterization) For each property P of the accessibility relation and each general Kripke structure K:
Proof: The proof is straightforward for each of the properties in Subsection 2.6. We provide the details only for two cases:
(rule X) Let P state that the relation is irreflexive. Then: K ∈ K P iff w w for every w ∈ W iff {w} ⊆ N Alg(K) (w) for every w ∈ W . We have to show that the latter holds iff, for every Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ρ, α, β, Alg(K)αβ Ωτ 1 ρ,
(⇒) Assume that, for every w ∈ W , {w} ⊆ N Alg(K) (w). It is sufficient to show that Alg(K)αβ ) . Then, for each w ∈ W , choose Γ 1 = Γ 2 = ∅, ρ such that ρ(τ 1 ) = x 1 , and α such that α(x 1 ) = {w}. Therefore, Alg(K)α τ 1 ρ ⊑ N(τ 1 ρ) and, so, {w} ⊆ N Alg(K) (w).
(rule W) Let P state that the relation is transitive and well bounded.
(⇒) Assume that the relation is transitive and well bounded and that rule W does not hold. Then, there is ρ fulfilling the proviso and an assignment α such that Alg(K)αβ
Since the relation is transitive and well bounded, we can choose a maximal w fulfilling the previous conditions, that is, if
Therefore there is β such that the premise of W is not fulfilled, which contradicts our hypothesis.
(⇐) Assume that rule W holds.
(a) Assume that the relation is not transitive. Then, there are w 1 , w 2 , w 3 such that {w 2 } ⊆ N Alg(K) (w 1 ), {w 3 } ⊆ N Alg(K) (w 2 ) and {w 3 } ⊆ N Alg(K) (w 1 ). Consider the ground substitution ρ such that Γ 1 ρ = Γ 2 ρ = ∅, τ 1 ρ = x 1 , τ 2 ρ = x 2 and τ 3 ρ = y 1 . Let α be an assignment such that α(x 1 ) = {w 1 } and α(x 2 ) = W \ {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }. Then Alg(K)α ℧x 1 and Alg(K)α N(x 1 ) ⊑ x 2 and so Alg(K)α 
. Therefore the rule does not hold, which is a contradiction with the hypothesis.
(b) Assume that the relation is transitive but not well bounded. Then, there is a sequence {w i } i∈N such that {w i+1 , w i+2 , . . . } ⊆ N Alg(K) (w i ) for all i ∈ N. Consider the ground substitution ρ such that Γ 1 ρ = Γ 2 ρ = ∅, τ 1 ρ = x 1 , τ 2 ρ = x 2 and τ 3 ρ = y 1 . Let α be an assignment such that α(x 1 ) = {w 0 } and
Therefore the rule does not hold, which is a contradiction with the hypothesis. QED
Observe that the characterization theorem above shows that the rules proposed in Subsection 2.6 characterize the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation even among general Kripke structures.
We now turn our attention to soundness and completeness of the modal sequent calculi over the general Kripke semantics. Soundness is easy to obtain, but, in order to establish completeness, we have to start by showing how to extract a general Kripke structure from a Σ K -algebra appropriate for the sequent rules of a modal system. Recall that Σ K = C, O, X, Y, Z is the modal signature introduced in Subsection 2.5.
Let A = F, T, · A be a Σ K -algebra. Consider Kpk(A) = W, , B, V where:
In the sequel, we may write f for f A when the underlying algebra is clear from the context. Proposition 3.19 Given a Σ K -algebra A appropriate for C K , the tuple Kpk(A) is a general Kripke structure over C.
Proof:
(1) W is non empty. Indeed, by absurd, assume that W = Ω A = ∅. Then, since A is appropriate for rules cons and Ω, we would conclude that ⊤ ∈ Ω A .
(2) W ∈ B. Indeed, W = [[t]] A since A is appropriate for rule Rt.
(3) B is closed for complements. More precisely, we have to show that if f ∈ B then (W \ f ) ∈ B. Observe that W \ f = {t ∈ W : t ≤ A f }. We show below that {t ∈ W : t ≤ A f } = {t ∈ W : t ≤ A ¬ A (f )}. Thus, the result follows since the latter set is ¬ A (f ) which is in B.
(i) {t ∈ W : t ≤ A f } ⊆ {t ∈ W : t ≤ A ¬ A (f )}. Indeed, assume that t ≤ A f whenever t ∈ Ω A . So, by definition of satisfaction, choosing α such that α(x 1 ) = t and α(z 1 ) = f , we have Aα
Therefore, by Theorem 3.4,
Again by definition of satisfaction and taking into account the choice of α, we get t ≤ A ¬ A (f ) whenever t ∈ Ω A .
(ii) {t ∈ W :
Thus, the result follows since the latter set is ∨ A (f, g) which is in B.
Indeed, assume that t ≤ A f or t ≤ A g whenever t ∈ Ω A . So, by definition of satisfaction, choosing α such that α(x 1 ) = t, α(z 1 ) = f and α(z 2 ) = g we have Aα
by rule R∨. Therefore, by Theorem 3.4,
. Again by definition of satisfaction and taking into account the choice of α, we get t
The proof is similar taking into account
(5) B is closed for necessitations. More precisely, denoting by L( f ) the set {t ∈ W : t t ′ implies t ′ ∈ f for every t ′ ∈ W }, we have to
We show below the latter set is equal to {t ∈ W : t ≤ A A (f )}. Thus, the result follows since the latter set is A (f ) which is in B.
. So, by definition of satisfaction, choosing α such that α(x 1 ) = t and α(z 1 ) = f , we have
by rules R and Rgen. Therefore, by Theorem 3.4 Ωx 1 ,
Again by definition of satisfaction and taking into account the choice of α, we get
QED
The following results show that the semantics of ground simple formulae is preserved when we move from a Σ K -algebra appropriate for C K to the corresponding general Kripke structure. Lemma 3.20 Let A be a Σ K -algebra appropriate for C K . Then, for every ground simple formula ϕ,
Proof:
(Step) We have to consider only three representative cases: 
QED Proposition 3.21 Given a Σ K -algebra A appropriate for C K and a ground simple formula ϕ, A ⊤ ≤ ϕ iff Kpk(A) ϕ.
Since A is appropriate for rules ⊤ and transF, for every
] A , and, so, A ⊤ ≤ ϕ. QED Proposition 3.22 Given a Σ K -algebra A appropriate for C K , an assignment β over A such that β(y 1 ) = u ∈ Ω A and a ground simple formula ϕ, Aαβ y 1 ≤ ϕ iff Kpk(A)u ϕ.
Given a class A of Σ K -algebras appropriate for the sequent rules of modal system K, let Kpk(A) be the class {Kpk(A) : A ∈ A}.
Theorem 3.23 Given a class A of Σ K -algebras appropriate for C K :
Proof: Immediate using the two propositions above. QED
We are now ready to establish the counterpart of Theorem 3.18.
Theorem 3.24 Cocharacterization For each property P of the accessibility relation and each Σ K -algebra A appropriate for C K :
Proof: Straightforward for each of the properties in Subsection 2.6. For instance, let P state that the relation is irreflexive. Then: Kpk(A) ∈ K P iff u u for every u ∈ W = Ω A iff u ⊑ A N A (u) for every u ∈ W . So, we have to show that the latter holds iff, for every
QED And, finally, we are now able to prove the envisaged completeness result over general Kripke semantics.
Theorem 3.25 (Modal Kripke soundness and completeness) For each finite set P of properties of the accessibility relation:
Proof: (Global completeness) Assume that ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k ⊢ g C P ϕ. Then, by Corollary 3.12, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k g app(C P ) ϕ. That is, there is A ∈ app(C P ) such that A ⊤ ≤ ψ i for i = 1, . . . , k and A ⊤ ≤ ϕ. Let A be such an algebra and K = Kpk(A). Then, by Theorem 3.24, we know that K ∈ K P . Furthermore, by Proposition 3.21, K ψ i for i = 1, . . . , k and K ϕ. Therefore, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k
So, by global completeness as proved above,
It is straightforward to adapt the results in this subsection (about C K and its extensions) to the hybrid calculi introduced in Subsection 2.7.
We refrain to develop the details on this side issue, but it is worthwhile to comment on the nature of Kpk(A) when A is appropriate for C @ K . Since, F A contains elements representing all elements of ℘W , B collapses into ℘W in the resulting Kripke structure. Therefore, denoting by sK P the class of all standard Kripke structures with set P of properties imposed on the accessibility relation, the theorem above becomes: Theorem 3.26 For each finite set P of properties of the accessibility relation:
Duality between sober algebras and Kripke structures
In the previous subsection, we saw how to extract a Σ K -algebra from a general Kripke structure and vice versa. It is natural to ask what is the relationship, if any, between A and Alg(Kpk(A)) and also between K and Kpk(Alg(K)). In order to answer these questions, first we need to set up the category of Σ kalgebras and the category of general Kripke structures.
Recall that a p-morphism h :
General Kripke structures together with p-morphisms constitute the category K. Observe that condition d) is equivalent to
In order to set up the envisaged category of Σ K -algebras we propose the following notion of morphism between such algebras. To this end, we need the following notation:
• ⌈t⌉ A = {u ∈ Ω A : u ⊑ A t};
h where:
It is straightforward to verify that Σ K -algebras together with these morphisms constitute a category that we denote by A. This notion of morphism is sufficiently strong to ensure the preservation and reflection of satisfaction of labelled formula. To this end, it is convenient to make explicit the structure of an unbound variable assignment α over a Σ-algebra by identifying each such α with the pair α| X , α| Z . Theorem 3.27 (Satisfaction condition) Let h : A → A ′ be a morphism, θ ∈ gT(Σ K ) without bounded variables, ϕ ∈ gF(Σ K ), α an unbounded variable assignment over A, and α ′ an unbounded variable assignment over A ′ . Then:
Proof: The following two equalities can be proved by induction on the complexity of θ and ϕ, respectively:
Corollary 3.28 Let h : A → A ′ be a morphism, θ ∈ cgT(Σ K ) without bounded variables, and ϕ ∈ cgF(Σ K ). Then:
We now turn our attention towards extending the maps Alg and Kpk to functors.
Proposition 3.29 Given a p-morphism
is established for each representative modal constructor:
which is identical to {w : N Alg(K ′ ) ({h(w)}) ⊆ B ′ } which thanks to 4) below coincides with {w :
So, by property b) of the p-morphism, there is w ∈ W such that h(w) = w ′ and u w. That is, thanks to the definition of Alg(K), w ∈ N Alg(K) ({u}) and, therefore, h(w) = w ′ is in h(N Alg(K) (U )). (⊇) Consider any w ∈ N Alg(K) (U ). Then, there is u ∈ U such that u w. So, by property a) of the p-morphism, h(u)
It is now straightforward to verify that the map Alg can be extended to a functor from K to A op . Furthermore, the map Kpk can also be extended to a functor from A op to K thanks to the following result.
Proposition 3.30 Given a morphism
h : A ′ → A, the map ← − h | Ω A is a p- morphism from Kpk(A) → Kpk(A ′ ).
Proof:
direction, the quotient functor Q : A → sA can be obtained by the composition Q 2 • Q 1 where:
• Q 1 : A →sA, denoting bysA the full subcategory of A with all algebras that are sober with respect to ∼ (but not necessarily with respect to ≈), defined as follows:
Note that Q 1 (A) is well defined since ∼ A is a congruence relation.
Observe that Q(h) is well defined thanks to property 7) of h.
• Q 2 :sA → sA defined as follows:
Note that Q 2 (A) is well defined since ≈ A is a congruence relation.
Observe that Q 2 (h) is well defined thanks to property 6) of h.
Let I 1 :sA → A and I 2 : sA →sA be the inclusion functors. Then, it is straightforward to show that Q 1 is left adjoint for I 1 and Q 2 is right adjoint for I 2 . Hence, sA is a coreflective subcategory ofsA andsA is a reflective category of A. So, Q corresponds to a canonical construction, in this case by composition of two universal constructions.
In fact, for the purposes of this paper, we could work within sA instead of working in A since the following result holds:
Proof: The result follows straightforwardly, by noting that the two equalities hold:
. QED Furthermore, observe that Alg(K) is in sA. So, the functor Alg : K → A induces a functor from K to sA that we denote by sAlg. Letting sKpk be the restriction of functor Kpk to sA, we now establish the envisaged duality between sober algebras and general Kripke structures.
Theorem 3.33 (Duality) Functor sKpk : sA op → K is left adjoint for functor sAlg : K → sA op .
Let A = F, T, · A be a sober Σ K -algebra. Denote the set { f A : f ∈ F } by F A . Consider the maps:
(i) We first show that the pair
. . , f k ) holds for each representative constructor:
(f ) Observe that f sAlg(sKpk(A)) = ∅ by definition of sAlg. And so is f A A because A is appropriate for rules Rf and Ω⊥. Therefore:
And the latter is equal to p iA A by definition of sKpk. Thus:
That is, u ∈ ⌈t⌉ A and, so, u ⊑ A t. On the other hand, ← − η A (⌈t⌉ A ) = {⌈v⌉ A : v ∈ Ω A and v ⊑ A t} which, since A is sober and appropriate for rule Rasym, is equal to {{v} : v ∈ Ω A and v ⊑ A t} which obviously contains {u}.
. Indeed, thanks to the definition of sAlg, this assertion is equivalent to ← − η A (⊥ A ) ⊆ ∅. Moreover, ← − η A (⊥ A ) = {u ∈ Ω A : u ⊑ A ⊥ A } which is the empty set since A is appropriate for rule Ω⊥. (4) N sAlg(sKpk(A)) ( ← − η A (t)) ≈ sAlg(sKpk(A)) ← − η A (N A (t)). Indeed, the former set is equal to N sAlg(sKpk(A)) ({u ∈ Ω A : u ⊑ A t}) which, by the definition of the twogenerating new variable names. For this reason we can safely relax the notion of analyticity so that we can claim that a sequent calculus composed only of non creative or blindly creative rules is still analytic.
In the case of a strongly creative rule, like, for instance, the cut rules, when applying the rule in a derivation, the instances of the additional meta-variables must really be chosen and the wrong choice may lead to dead ends. So, these rules do raise real problems for automation.
Fortunately, it may happen that a strongly creative rule need only to be applied in the following analytical sense: the instance of each additional metavariable in the premises may be chosen among the terms/formulae occurring in the instance of the conclusion or in the hypotheses of the derivation. If we are sure that all strongly creative rules require only analytical applications then automation is still feasible (although more expensive). For this reason, we further relax the notion of analyticity so that we can claim that a sequent calculus that does not require non analytical applications of strongly creative rules is still analytical.
In the case of the sequent calculi at hand, we have to look at the following strongly creative rules:
• structural: cutT and cutF;
• order: transT, transF, LgenT and LgenF;
• system K: RNΩ, L and R♦;
• other modal systems: 5.
Can we guarantee that by restricting ourselves only to analytical applications of these strongly creative rules nothing is lost? That is, the sequent calculi remain complete if we restrict the use of these rules? More precisely, if we replace, for instance the the rule cutT by its restricted form:
where (τ 1 , ξ 1 ∈ Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(ρ) = 1 iff both ρ(τ 1 ) and ρ(ξ 1 ) occur in ρ(Γ 1 ) ∪ ρ(Γ 2 ) or in the hypotheses.
Fortunately, the answer is positive. Indeed, careful examination of the proofs of the relevant metatheorems in Subsection 2.9 and of the completeness results in Section 3, shows that appropriateness for each of these rules was invoked only in its restricted form.
So, it is useful to introduce the following notions. A sequent calculus is said to be restricted if it contains no strongly creative rule that is not in its restricted form. For each finite set P of properties of the accessibility relation considered in Subsection 2.6, let also C • P denote the restricted version of C P . Finally, we say that a derivation is a restricted derivation if does not contain any non analytical application of a strongly creative rule.
In the discussion above we established the following results about the restricted subcalculi of the sequent calculi at hand: Theorem 3.34 (Algebraic completeness) Every full restricted structural sequent logic endowed with rules using only persistent provisos is complete. In other words, albeit by semantic non constructive means, we proved the following elimination result: Theorem 3.36 Given a derivation in C P of a closed sequent s, there is a restricted derivation of s in C P .
Concluding remarks
By using truth values as labels, we were able to provide analytical labelled sequent calculi for a wide class of normal modal systems sharing a common core of rules (structural rules, order rules, and rules for the formula constructors). The calculus for each modal system is obtained by adding to this common core rules on the truth values imposing the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation. We also managed to keep an effective separation between the subcalculus on the formulae and the sub-calculus on the truth values. Therefore, the way is open for proving desirable proof-theoretic properties of, at least, the formula sub-calculus like, for instance, the elimination of rule cutF (cf the results in [16] where a similar separation was explored in the case of a natural deduction calculus labelled with worlds for obtaining normalization results).
These calculi were shown to be strongly complete (for both global and local reasoning) with respect to the novel two-sorted algebraic semantics, and, as a corollary, also with respect to the general Kripke semantics. For this purpose, we had to indicate how to move back and forth between such algebras and general Kripke structures. This led to a duality between the category of sober algebras and the category of general Kripke structures (with p-morphisms). A simple enrichment of the language (by adding the coercion operator @) was shown to allow reasoning complete with respect to standard Kripke structures.
It is worthwhile to comment on the nature of the two-sorted algebras. In a sense they are halfway between general Kripke structures and modal algebras. We may look at them as general Kripke structures without points. The main results of the paper clearly show that the loss of the points was possible while preserving the ability to spell out the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation. One might argue that we do keep points through the Ω predicate. To some extent this is a fair observation, but we should stress that the calculi impose very little about the atomic truth values, for sure much less than what is implied by set theory about singletons.
The proposed sequent calculi labelled with truth values are relevant to automation and to the theory and applications of the combination of deduction systems. Furthermore, the two-sorted algebraic semantics introduced herein seems to achieve the right balance between modal algebras and Kripke structures by sharing the advantages of both. Indeed, while algebraic in flavor, this new semantics still allows the specification of modal systems with rules reflecting the envisaged properties of the accessibility relation, fully characterizing those systems even among general Kripke structures.
Capitalizing on the results of this paper, several lines of research are evident at this stage. First, taking advantage of the separation between the formula sub-calculus and the truth value sub-calculus, there is hope of obtaining useful proof-theoretic results about the proposed modal calculi (for instance, elimination of rule cutF and control of the application of other rules such as contractions), towards making the calculi even more interesting from an automation point of view. Second, extrapolating from the preliminary ideas in Subsection 2.7, the relationship to hybrid logic seems to be a fruitful line of research, for instance towards a hybrid logic over truth values (instead of worlds). Third, given the generality of the approach (well illustrated by the algebraic completeness theorem that requires very little from the calculus at hand), it is feasible to set up sequent calculi labelled with truth values for other types of logic (like intuitionistic, relevance, many-valued logics) and develop a theory of fibring such calculi (where the general algebraic completeness result obtained in this paper can be used in the style of [18, 15] for establishing the preservation of completeness by fibring).
